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I. INTRODUCTION
For candidates and other political advertisers, the 1984 elections may be
a watershed in the use of new media technologies. Thirty-eight percent of
American homes with television sets now subscribe to cable television." Direct
broadcast satellites, videotex, teletext, subscription television, multiple distri-
bution systems, satellite master-antenna television, low power television, and
electronic mail will be reaching enough viewers to make them attractive media
for candidates and campaigns by the mid- to late-1980's.
With the advent of these technologies, the historical distinctions between
broadcasting and common carriage2 have become less clear. The Federal Com-
munication Commission (FCC), operators, and candidates must deal with the
issues created by the equal opportunity (equal time) and fairness doctrine re-
quirements" and decide whether these traditional broadcast principles apply to
* Copyright 0 1984 by Daniel P. Swillinger.
t Special Counsel to the Media Access Project, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1964; J.D., 1967,
Ohio State University. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the staff and interns at
the Media Access Project.
I. Information obtained from the National Cable Television Ass'n (July, 1983).
2. The Communications Act of 1934 defines broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio
communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay
stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976). The Act defines a common carrier as "any person engaged
as a common carrier for hire." Id. § 153(h). Common carriers provide facilities for all members
of the public to transmit communications. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Stern, Krasnow, & Senkowski, The New Video
Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 529,
568-69 (1983).
3. The fairness doctrine developed from the belief that the limited number of broadcast
frequencies makes the airwaves "a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized
1
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the new communications media. These issues are sensitive because they affect
the cornerstone of our system of government, the political process. The first
amendment envisions a system of self-government based on free discussion
that allows voters "to make informed choices among candidates.' 4 The elec-
tronic media dominate the providing of information that forms the basis for
that discussion. There is legitimate concern that the first amendment rights of
broadcasters and related providers of information not be unduly impinged. In
the sensitive area of political campaigns, however, where meaningful "alterna-
tive channels for communication ' 5 do not exist, the counterveiling right of citi-
zen access to candidates and issues also must be given great weight. Failure to
require roughly equal treatment of candidates and issues may well "undermine
democratic processes."6 Thus, just as the state may impose reasonable restric-
tions to facilitate the functioning of the electoral process-e.g., barring the
sale of alcoholic beverages on election day, or preventing campaigning within
fifty feet of polling places-it may reasonably regulate to ensure the free flow
of political information.'
This Article reviews the current political information regulatory scheme
of several of the new media technologies, and it suggests that the equal oppor-
tunity and fairness doctrine requirements should apply to a number of them.
II. THE NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES
A. Cable Television
Cable television is the most watched, most regulated, and most confusing
medium in the application of equal opportunity and fairness doctrine require-
ments. The FCC first applied these rules to cable systems before receiving
only by the Government." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). The
doctrine requires the broadcast media to provide air time for balanced coverage of controversial
issues of public importance. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974). The fairness doctrine
does not require broadcast licensees to provide access to particular persons, groups, or viewpoints.
Broadcasters may exercise discretion in selecting the time and manner of presentation of conflict-
ing views. Id. at 9, 11, 16; see CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118-19 (1973).
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act provides that "[i]f any licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station,
he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station," subject to certain exceptions. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). Section 315 is
triggered only when a candidate actually appears in a broadcast. It does not apply when a candi-
date appears in a newscast, news interview, news documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of news
events. Id.
4. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
5. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
6. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
7. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the right of access of candidates
to the airwaves. While acknowledging the first amendment guarantees of journalistic freedom, it
has concluded that "the statutory right of access . . . properly balances the First Amendment
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statutory authority8 under the standard "reasonably ancillary to broadcast-
ing." Subsequently, section 315(c) of the Federal Communications Act was
amended to include cable operators under political broadcasting rules.10 As a
result, the FCC adjusted its regulatory scheme to reflect court decisions11 and
decided not to apply the equal opportunity and fairness doctrine requirements
to access programing. 12 The FCC retained the regulations applying these re-
quirements to cable originators.13
On March 31, 1983, the FCC adopted a rulemaking notice seeking public
comment on the reduction or elimination of political broadcast rules as they
apply to cable television.14 This notice brings into focus a series of issues relat-
ing to the regulation of political broadcasting on cable television, and it raises
questions about the effect that the elimination of these rules would have on
political candidates.
While the equal opportunity requirement has been specifically applied to
cable operators by statute,15 the fairness doctrine's application, it is argued, is
a creature of regulation. There is, however, substantial support for the proposi-
tion that the 1959 amendments to the Communications Act e codified the fair-
ness doctrine as part of the Act, thus preventing its repeal by administrative
regulation. The FCC has recently suggested that cable systems do not occupy
scarce radio frequency space, and that therefore the "scarcity rationale"17 is
not a proper basis for applying the doctrine to cable systems. 8 Absent the
scarcity rationale, suggests the Commission, the first amendment rights of
broadcasters override the Commission's regulatory authority, and therefore
cable operators should not be subject to fairness obligations.
The Supreme Court held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC19 that
"[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount."2 0 Removing the fairness' doctrine's application to cable
could injure this right in one of its most crucial areas-the political arena. The
Court has recognized that "it is of particular importance that candidates have
8. First Report & Order in Docket No. 18,397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
9. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
10. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 104(c), 86 Stat. 4, 7 (1972) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(c)
(1976)).
11. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (invalidated FCC regula-
tions requiring cable operators to provide access channels for government, public, or educational
use).
12. Order in Docket No. 20,508, 83 F.C.C.2d 147 (1980).
13. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209 (1982). Origination programming is subject to the "ex-
clusive control" of the cable operator. Id. § 76.5(w).
14. 48 Fed. Reg. 26,472 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
15. See Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32
CATH. U.L. REv. 603, 606 (1983); note 10 and accompanying text supra.
16. Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, 558 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)).
17. The scarcity rationale was part of the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which upheld the constitutionality of the
fairness doctrine as applied to broadcasters. See note 3 supra.
18. 48 Fed. Reg. 26,472, 26,480 & n.18 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
19. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
20. Id. at 390.
1984]
3
Swillinger: Swillinger: Candidates and the New Technologies:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the . . . opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may
intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on
vital public issues before choosing among them on election day."2 1
Scarcity does exist in the franchising of cable systems. 22 Just as constitu-
tionally permissible government regulation prohibits an individual from oper-
ating a radio or TV station without a license, local government franchising
creates a monopoly for the local cable operator. There is almost never more
than one cable operator in a particular community. This circumstance will
continue well into the future, since most cable operators have long-term exclu-
sive franchises. The cable operator, an unelecfed private individual or corpora-
tion selected by local government, has exclusive control over what channels
subscribers receive. Because the number of cable systems generally is fixed at
one, the scarcity in cable systems is at least as great as the scarcity of
frequencies.23
Cable television, unlike newspapers, involves a form of government regu-
lated scarcity that prevents many members of the public from owning and
operating cable systems. The government may regulate cable television to in-
sure that there is an opportunity for the presentation of views expressed by
those excluded from cable ownership. As the Supreme Court stated in Red
Lion:
[T]he First Amendment confers no right . . . to an unconditional mo-
nopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right
to use. . . .It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given
the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire com-
munity, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great pub-
lic concern. 24
Cable operators also are proxies for the community, and they should provide
response time for a candidate whose opponent has been endorsed on the cable
system.
The measure of fairness by which broadcast licensees are obliged to abide
21. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976).
22. See Community Communication Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F.
Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983); see also Omega Satellite Prods. v. Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.
1982) (telephone pole and underground duct limits on cable transmission are analogous to radio
frequency interference).
23. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), afj'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979) and Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1978), are often cited for the proposition that absent physical scarcity, any "economic scar-
city" which limits communities to a single operator cannot justify applying the fairness doctrine.
Cable operators, however, do face a physical scarcity, not a scarcity of frequencies, but the "sheer
limit on the number of cables that can be strung on existing telephone poles" or laid underground
in public right of ways. Community Communication Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
24. 395 U.S. at 391, 394. The Supreme Court recognized the need for regulation even in
the absence of physical scarcity, because cable operators benefit from a "preferred position con-
ferred by the government." Id. at 400.
[Vol. 49
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inheres in the public interest standard under Title III of the Communications
Act of 1934.25 While the FCC had long recognized that fairness was a statu-
tory requirement 2 6 the 1959 amendment to section 315(a) of the Communica-
tions Act 27 made it plain that Congress understood that the obligation of fair-
ness was imposed under the Act. Congress did not merely "ratify" the
Commission's fairness doctrine; it made the obligation a binding part of the
statute.
28
One way to discuss the application of the equal opportunity and fairness
doctrine principles under current regulation, the potential effects of ending
regulation, and some proposals to meet existing and potential problems, is to
look at the four general sources of programing carried on cable systems.
1. Retransmission of Imported Signals
The retransmission of the "super stations"2" has become a staple of cable
systems across the country, along with the importation of nearby but nonethe-
less distant signals. The FCC maintains that the super stations, as local broad-
casters, are subject to the equal opportunity and fairness doctrine require-
ments, while concluding that retransmitting systems are not similarly
obligated.30
Thus, if a congressional candidate from northern Virginia is interviewed
on a "Phil Donahue" type programs' on WGN in Chicago, it would constitute
a "use" only if he were a Chicago-area candidate.3 2 If the northern Virginia
cable system carries WGN, this appearance would not give his opponent the
right to an equal opportunity, since the local cable system does not "control"
the retransmission. The opponent has no right to an equal opportunity on
WGN since he is not a candidate in the station's local service area. But what
about a presidential general election candidate? In the event that a "use" oc-
curred, the right to an equal opportunity on WGN would be available to the
opponent. The effect, however, is not clear if a local cable system pre-empted
the opponent's time.3 The ability to pre-empt might constitute "control" and
25. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). The legislative history of the 1959 amendment to section
315(a) consistently links operating in the public interest with presenting important public issues
fairly and impartially. See S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2564, 2571; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380.
26. See, e.g., Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372,
26,374 n.6 (1974).
27. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380; Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d
16 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 51 (1978).
29. Examples include WTBS-TV, Atlanta, Georgia; WGN-TV, Chicago, Illinois; and
WOR-TV, New York, New York.
30. See note 35 infra.
31. The Donahue program is not a news interview program exempt from equal opportunity
restrictions. Multimedia Program Prods., Inc., 80 F.C.C.2d 217 (1980).
32. For a discussion of the definition of "use," see notes 80-87 and accompanying text
infra.
33. This practice presumably is prohibited by the copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. § IIl
1984]
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subject the local system to an equal opportunity claim.
It seems likely that national candidates in 1984 will purchase advertising
on the super stations as a cost-effective way of reaching a significant portion of
the electorate. This will create an equal opportunity right for opponents to
purchase equivalent time because the advertising is being broadcast locally.
The issue, however, is what equal opportunity rights are created at the local
cable system level. Should the local operator at least be obliged to carry that
candidate advertising? This question remains unanswered.
2. Original Satellite Programing
Local cable systems carry a number of channels of original programing
provided by satellite. ESPN, C-SPAN, and the Movie Channel are prominent
examples. Unlike the super stations, these programers are not regulated-by
the FCC or anyone else. Under current FCC policy, neither equal time nor
fairness doctrine requirements apply to this original satellite programing.'
ESPN, for example, could sell advertising to a candidate and would be under
no obligation to provide equal time. Similarly, it could carry an endorsement
of a candidate, carry programing constituting a personal attack on a person or
institution, or treat a controversial issue of public importance without being
obligated to carry opposing views.35
The equal opportunity and fairness doctrine rules should be applied to
satellite programing. The programer has a choice of whether to carry advertis-
ing or endorsements, just as a broadcaster has a choice whether to accept paid
political issue advertising.386 If they are carried, then the programmer should
be required to provide equal time or response time.
Admittedly, the current communications statutory and regulatory scheme
does not provide an obvious basis for the imposition of regulation on the satel-
lite programer. The FCC regulates satellites used by the programers only as
common carriers; there is no content regulation.37 The issue, however, is as
much about election regulation as communications regulation. A combination
of sound public policy, a legitimate governmental interest in regulating elec-
(1982).
34. The "reasonable access" provision for federal candidates in § 312(a)(7) is not applica-
ble to any form of cable programming. Title I of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act in-
cluded a provision applying § 312(a)(7) to cable. It was repealed as part of the 1974 Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 205(b), 88 Stat. 1263, 1278 (1974).
The repeal of Title I appears to have been a legislative oversight, rather than a policy decision. It
makes little sense for Congress to have originally applied both §§ 312 & 315 to cable, and then
arbitrarily repeal the application of § 312.
35. The FCC has limited the applicability of equal time and fairness doctrine to programs
originated by local cable operators. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76,205, 76,209 (1982). This is clearly contrary
to the statute, which places cable operators in the same posture as local TV stations. They are
responsible for all programming which they transmit, not just that which they originate.
36. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
37. Report & Order in Docket No. 16,495, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970).
[Vol. 49
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tions,38 and the intrusiveness of television39 provide a basis for regulating satel-
lite programers in the narrow context of political candidate broadcasting.
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo4 0 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring newspapers to afford a right of
reply to candidates. It has been argued that according to this decision, the first
amendment rights of cable operators would be abridged by obligating them to
comply with equal opportunity and fairness doctrine rules.41 The Court has
noted that the varying characteristics of the news media justify differences in
the first amendment standards applied to them.42 The almost absolute ability
of newspapers to operate free of governmental restriction has never been avail-
able to broadcasters. At least in their current mode of operation, cable systems
are not so different from broadcasters that they should be treated like newspa-
pers.43 The impact of the television screen, whether the program is broadcast
or cablecast, is immense. When the impact is directed at campaigns and elec-
tions, the public interest requires that full and vigorous debate be available to
the electorate.
Alternatively, the cable operator who makes the editorial decision to carry
ESPN or C-SPAN and who is already regulated by the FCC and local gov-
ernment could be obligated to adhere to equal opportunity and fairness doc-
trine requirements. "The FCC position of imposing equal opportunity and fair-
ness doctrine obligations only on cable origination is the result of
rulemaking,4" and the FCC has the authority to amend its rules to impose
requirements on the local operator in this context. This approach creates prac-
tical difficulties: the cable operator would have to know in advance that politi-
cal advertising was to be sent by the programer, contractually he would have
to be able to delete it, and he would have to have something to replace it. It
would seem easier to place the burden on the originator, who is benefiting
economically by selling the advertising time and can most easily, as a mechan-
ical matter, make equal time available.
3. "Must Carry" Requirements
A major portion of a local system's cable channels are devoted to signifi-
cantly viewed local area television stations. 5 All the programing carried on a
cable system is subject to equal opportunity and fairness doctrine requirements
38. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
39. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); see also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (creating a regulatory interest), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
40. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
41. See also Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978) (invalidated
FCC regulations requiring access to cable channels for government, public, or educational use),
a~ffd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidated
application of program fare regulations to pay-cable stations), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
42. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
43. See Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983).
44. See First Report & Order in Docket No. 18,397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
45. For a definition of "significantly viewed" stations, see 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(k) (1982).
1984]
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because the originator is a broadcaster. The requirements would not apply
only where there is a discontinuity between the service area of a broadcast
station and the significantly viewed area for "must carry" purposes. 40 For in-
stance, a candidate for an office outside of the station's service area could
appear, create a use, and have the appearance "must carried" into the electo-
ral district. The opponent would have no equal time right, however, since the
election is outside of the originating station's service area, and the cable opera-
tor did not originate the program.
4. Local Origination
FCC rules apply equal opportunity and fairness doctrine requirements to
local cable origination programing.47 The regulations are essentially identical
to those for broadcasters, with the same news program exemptions for equal
time. The rules apply to locally-originated programs and advertising, a very
small portion of cable programs. This presumably includes local ads inserted
in non-local programs. It does not include access channels. 48 It is these rules
which the FCC is currently opening for repeal or modification.
Since the Commission recognizes that it cannot repeal the equal opportu-
nity requirement, it is seeking to minimize regulation. The FCC currently is
seeking comments on the proposal by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce that
equal time obligations be met through use of access channels. 49 This proposal
would effectively repeal equal opportunity requirements, since it would mean
that candidate ads which are aired during a popular prime time program
merely trigger the right for the opponent to appear on the access channel. An
appearance on an access channel would not be an equal opportunity in terms
of audience and would not be on the same channel.
Equal opportunity rules as currently applied to cable origination should
remain unchanged. This will be important in the future as cable reaches more
homes. Candidates, particularly those in legislative districts where broadcast
advertising is prohibitively expensive, may begin to use cable as a significant
part of their advertising campaigns.
The fairness doctrine is in a different posture. The FCC's view is that the
doctrine is not statutory and thus can be rescinded by regulation.50 It has been
suggested, however, that the 1959 Amendments to the Communications Act
enacted the fairness doctrine as part of the Act. 51 Moreover, the doctrine
should remain intact and applicable to cable as a matter of policy. Candidates
46. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59, .61 (1982) outline the local stations that must be carried on cable
systems in specific geographic areas.
47. Id. §§ 76.205, .209.
48. Order in Docket No. 20,508, 83 F.C.C.2d 147 (1980).
49. 48 Fed. Reg. 26,472, 26,473 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
50. Id. at 26,483 n.64.
51. See Geller & Lampert, supra note 15, at 606.
[Vol. 49
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ought to be entitled to reply to editorials endorsing opponents. Individuals and
institutions ought to be able to respond to personal attacks. Both sides of con-
troversial issues of public importance should be carried. Commission-created
political rights, such as the "Zapple doctrine," 52 which is as much quasi-fair-
ness as it is quasi-equal opportunity, should remain available.
The NTIA proposal to substitute access channels for a real right to re-
spond is inadequate. Equally deficient are such ideas as grouping all channels
on a cable system to determine whether fairness doctrine requirements are
being met. The political process is too important for candidates and issues not
to have certain extraordinary rights to reach the public.
B. Direct Broadcast Satellites
The Direct Broadcast Satellite Service (DBS) is a radio-communication
service in which signals from earth stations are retransmitted by satellite for
direct reception by home terminals.58 Direct broadcast satellites can transmit
signals much more powerful than those of current communications satellites,
allowing reception of television broadcasts by small home dishes."
Whether the equal opportunity and fairness doctrine rules apply to DBS
is determined by whether the FCC classifies the applicant's proposal as broad-
casting or as common carriage. If the applicant's proposal closely resembles
broadcasting, then the requirements generally applicable to broadcasting, in-
cluding those relating to political content, will apply.55
Inquiring into the development of regulatory policy in regard to DBS, the
Commission has noted that it will "impose any applicable statutory require-
ments upon interim DBS systems," including equal opportunity and fairness
doctrine in the case of broadcasters, and 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-2245' for common
carriers. 57 The Commission proposed to resolve "classification questions. . . in
the context of considering each individual application,158 believing that the
public interest will be served by maintaining a flexible approach that will al-
low satellite operators to act as "broadcasters, common carriers, private radio
operators, or some combination or variant of these classifications" acccording
to what they find "most feasible."'59
The Commission has provided a general account of the standards that
guide its classification decision making. If an applicant proposes to provide
direct-to-line service and retains control over the content of the transmissions,
the service is probably a broadcast service and the broadcasting provisions of
52. See Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970) (statement by candidate's spokesman
invokes equal time for opponent).
53. See Stem, Krasnow & Senkowski, supra note 2, at 541.
54. Id. at 541-42.
55. Report & Order in Docket No. 80-603, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 709 (1982).
56. (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
57. Report & Order in Docket No. 80-603, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 709 (1982).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 708-09.
1984]
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Title III will apply.60 If the applicant offers its "satellite transmission services
indiscriminately to the public pursuant to tariff under the provisions of Title II
of the Act," 61 it will be a common carrier. The applicant may have some sta-
tions in each category.
Programer-customers of common carrier DBS operators will not be sub-
ject to content regulation. The Commission has argued that any control of this
sort would: merely duplicate the more pervasive access obligations already im-
posed upon the carrier itself; go against the wishes of Congress, who probably
did not intend for the customers of common carriers to be licensed and regu-
lated as broadcasters; and be unnecessary because similar systems are in oper-
ation without regulation and without harm to the public. 62 Thus, common car-
rier DBS will be completely insulated from the political broadcasting rules.
The advent of DBS provides yet another way for political advertisers to
target potential voters. At least two companies (United Satellite Communica-
tions Inc. and Inter-American Satellite Television) are planning to provide sat-
ellite broadcast service by the end of 1983. By the end of 1984, COMSAT
expects to be broadcasting to subscribers with rooftop receiving dishes.03 There
should be little doubt that DBS programming is broadcasting, and therefore
subject to equal opportunity and fairness doctrine rules. The program origina-
tor, be it the satellite owner or a company leasing a transponder, is obligated
to carry out the requirements of section 315. The major issue is fixing the
responsibility for compliance, i.e., deciding who is accountable for meeting the
obligations under the rules.
C. Teletext
Teletext systems transmit textual and graphic material to home viewing
screens." The Commisson recently authorized television stations to engage in
teletext services.65 It permits stations to broadcast on the vertical blanking in-
terval (VBI)66 textual and graphic matter, which would appear on the televi-
sion screen of a subscriber with a decoder. A number of teletext systems are in
limited operation around the country; CBS is sending its Extravision teletext
services to all local affiliates. Limited local origination is planned for the near
future.
The FCC has decided that the equal opportunity and fairness doctrine
60. Id. at 709.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 710-11.
63. By 1986, U.S. Satellite Broadcasting Company plans to provide a free channel with
network-like programming, an all news, advertiser-supported channel, and a subscription and pay-
per-view channel with individual addressability capability. Com. Daily, July 14, 1983, at 6.
64. Stem, Krasnow, & Senkowski, supra note 2, at 534-35.
65. Report & Order in BC Docket No. 81-741, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,054 (1983) (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. pts. 2, 3, 74).
66. VBI is the black bar appearing on a television screen when the vertical hold is incor-
rectly adjusted. See Stern, Krasnow, & Senkowski, supra note 2, at 535 n.23.
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rules do not apply to teletext,67 a conclusion which is incorrect as a matter of
law. The Commission's rationale is illustrative of its approach to applying the
equal opportunity and fairness doctrine requlations to other new technologies.
Teletext is broadcasting, and all broadcasting is subject to these regulations.
Broadcasting is defined as "the dissemination of radio communications in-
tended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay
stations."68
The crucial factor in determining if programing is broadcasting is
whether it is intended for the use of the general public. Although content is a
factor to be considered, it is not dispositive. Mass appeal and availability
weigh in favor of finding that a particular activity is broadcasting. These fac-
tors may be negated by clear objective evidence that the programing is not
intended for use of the general public.69 Indeed, broadcasting remains broad-
casting even though a segment capable of receiving the broadcast signal is
equipped to delete a portion of that signal."0
The Commission has concluded that the reasonable access provision"
should not apply to teletext because the requirement "is adequately satisfied
by permitting federal candidates access to a licensee's regular broadcast oper-
ation."'72 The Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a)(7)73 confers an obligation on licensees "to tailor their responses to
accommodate, as much as reasonably possible, a candidate's stated purposes in
seeking air time. 174 "Across-the-board policies"75 are an unacceptable
response.
The Commission's approach ignores the statute and the Supreme Court's
construction. It is impossible to reconcile the duty to meet candidates' needs
with the Commission's decision to permit stations to "operate their teletext
service on a franchise basis or to lease space to multiple users."17 6 The stations
would be under no obligation to provide any access to candidates, even though
the teletext service might provide entry into specific markets of value to the
candidates. Under such circumstances, unless section 312(a)(7) is applied to
teletext, a broadcaster would have no power to meet, even in theory, a candi-
date's needs by offering access on the regular channel.
Consideration of the potential effect of the Commission's decision demon-
strates its inherent weakness. By not enforcing reasonable access to teletext, a
local teletext originator could repeatedly broadcast advertisements carrying
67. See Report, supra note 65, at 27,061-62.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976).
69. Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1980).
70. Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 813 (1959).
71. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
72. Report, supra note 65, at 27,061.
73. (1976).
74. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 387 (1981).
75. Id. at 387-88.
76. Report, supra note 65, at 27,060.
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the likeness of a candidate who chose not to advertise on the TV station whose
signal was original. An opponent's only recourse would be access on the regu-
lar TV airwaves. If the TV station has already provided both candidates with
paid or free time sufficient to meet the Commission's reasonable access re-
quirements, it would have no obligation to afford the opponent any access to
respond to the teletext programing. The opponent would be shut out.
Finally, the Commission relies on its decision that political broadcast
rules do not apply to FM SCA operations.7 A primary basis for this decision
is that broadcasting has been defined as communications intended for the gen-
eral public. 78 The Commission has determined that by contrast, SCA's are not
intended for the general public, but rather intended for a specialized audi-
ence. 79 The opposite is true here; teletext is intended for the general public,
and is wholly distinguishable from SCA service.
The Commission has decided that the equal opportunity provision in sec-
tion 315 is not applicable to teletext.80 The decision is predicated on the Com-
mission's conclusion that a candidate cannot make a personal appearance or
deliver a personal message on teletext; therefore, no "use" can occur and no
equal time obligation is created. The term "use" has no statutory definition; it
is interpreted by the FCC. The term's scope has expanded or narrowed to
reflect each Commission's understanding of the term and the evolving
technology.
The scope of the term "use" is very broad. In fact, "use" and the original
equal opportunity doctrine were included in section 18 of the Radio Act of
1927.81 At that time, television did not exist and the rule applied only to radio.
When the Communications Act of 1934 was adopted, section 18 was incorpo-
rated as section 315.82 Subsequently, the definition of "use" was expanded to
encompass television.83 Another change came in 1975, when the Commission
overruled three of its earlier decisions and held that under certain conditions
candidate appearances on broadcasts of debates and broadcasts of candidate
press conferences would not be a "use," but rather could be excepted from
equal opportunity requirements under the news program exemption. 8' The
clearest definition of "use" given by the Commission is found in its primer,
77. Greater Wash. Telecommunications Ass'n, Inc., 41 F.C.C.2d 948 (1974). FM SCA
stands for "FM Subsidiary Communication Authorizations," which are FCC regulations gov-
erning broadcasting on FM subcarrier frequencies adjacent to the main channel frequency. Spe-
cial receivers are required for reception of the subcarriers mixed into a main channel frequency.
See Stem, Krasnow, & Senkowski, supra note 2, at 561 n.174.
78. Functional Music, 274 F.2d at 548.
79. Greater Wash., 41 F.C.C.2d at 949.
80. See Report, supra note 65, at 27,061.
81. Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (repealed 1934).
82. Act of June 19, 1934, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1976)).
83. Interpretive Opinion, 26 F.C.C. 715 (1959); see Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887 (9th
Cir. 1974).
84. Aspen Institute, 55 F.C.C.2d 697 (1975), affd sub nom. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d
349 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
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The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting,8 5 where it is defined as
"any broadcast or cablecast of a candidate's voice or picture."86 The key is
whether the candidate is easily identifiable or recognizable by some means.8
7
Teletext has the technical capacity to meet the current definitional re-
quirement. It can produce graphic images, including logos of products and
perfectly recognizable portraits of persons, including candidates.88 To say that
a teletext portrait of a candidate accompanying a written campaign commer-
cial would not be the functional equivalent of a traditional TV "use" is to
ignore reality.
In keeping with the evolution of the definition, the Commission is re-
quired by the Communications Act to recognize the technology of teletext for
what it is-a slightly different way of broadcasting information-and adjust
its definition of "use" to include teletext images and text. Under the Commis-
sion's conclusion, a local teletext originator could repeatedly broadcast a can-
didate's campaign commercials-free or purchased-and the opponent would
have no right to respond.
The Commission has determined that the fairness doctrine does not apply
to teletext.89 The doctrine has assured that public issues are given roughly
balanced treatment. To exclude teletext from its purview would give teletext
operators "unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bid-
ders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and candi-
dates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed."9 The
Commission has stated that the 1959 legislative enactment concerning the
fairness doctrine in section 315 "does not mandate extension of the fairness
doctrine to new services like teletext.""1 Even if it is concluded that the 1959
amendments did incorporate the doctrine, to the FCC "it seems clear that
novel services such as teletext were beyond its scope."92
To the contrary, the public interest standard does require the application
of the doctrine to teletext. Congress "did not . . . give [the Commission] a
completely free hand for the future" regarding the fairness doctrine. 3 The
Commission's assertion that Congress has entrusted the matter entirely to the
discretion of the Commission is unfounded.9 4
If, as the Commission contends, it is not required to apply these princi-
ples, it should consider whether they should nonetheless be applied, in some
85. 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 (1978).
86. Id. at 2240.
87. Fleeting appearances are not uses. National Urban Coalition, 23 F.C.C.2d 123, 124
(1970).
88. CBS' Extravision teletext service has the capacity to broadcast in 512 shades of color.
Corn. Daily, May 26, 1983, at 5.
89. See Report, supra note 65, at 27,062.
90. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392.
91. Report, supra note 65, at 27,061.
92. Id. n.24.
93. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385.
94. See Report, supra note 65, at 27,061.
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form, as a matter of discretion. The origin of the fairness doctrine is in the
Commission's regulation under the public interest standard. Other mecha-
nisms, such as reasonable access, could also be adopted under the public inter-
est standard, perhaps in modified versions. The Commission's failure to ad-
dress these provisions effectively excluded discussion as to whether they should
be adopted as a matter of discretion. The FCC failed even to consider or seek
comment on alternatives which might be better suited to the special circum-
stances of teletext, but which would accommodate the needs of the listening
public, whose first amendment rights to receive information are
"paramount."' 5
D. Other Media
Other new technologies, like videotex, present similar problems. Videotex
is a two-way medium, permitting subscribers to respond to information pro-
vided textually and graphically.9 Subscribers may bank, pay bills, purchase
goods and services, as well as respond to requests for opinions-mini-polls, in
effect. Videotex is usually considered a common carrier service, since the in-
formation is transmitted over telephone wires or cable. The FCC has no ex-
isting or proposed rules or orders regarding the application of equal opportu-
nity and fairness doctrine requirements to videotex.
If videotex, which is essentially a television set hooked up to a central
computer, is limited to home banking and shopping, it is not likely that politi-
cal content will become an issue. The potential exists for local programing,
however, at least over those videotex operators using cable rather than tele-
phone wires. Unlike teletext, which is broadcasting, regulation of political in-
formation on videotex raises the same issues as with cable. Equal opportunity
and fairness doctrine requirements as now applied to local cable origination
ought to be applicable to videotex.
Multi-point distribution service (MDS) is a microwave transmission ser-
vice, with line-of-sight transmission of a signal which travels typically no more
than twenty-five miles. It is the noncable conduit for such services as Home
Box Office and Showtime. MDS is a common carrier and is not subject to the
rules regarding political broadcasting.97 According to a 1974 Report and Or-
der, MDS "offers a transmission service for hire and can not control program
material. . . . [The] carrier's responsibility is to provide a 'pipeline.' "go
A recent request for a declaratory ruling raises questions about the com-
mon carrier nature of MDS. An operator in San Antonio, Texas, has asked
the FCC to decide whether an MDS licensee may "refuse to transmit cus-
95. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
96. One-way transfer of textual information is teletext; two-way transfer is videotex. Stern,
Krasnow, & Senkowski, supra note 2, at 554-55.
97. The Commission has expressly declined to address the issue. Report & Order in Dock-
et No. 80-112, at 66-67 (May 26, 1983).
98. Docket No. 19,493, 45 F.C.C.2d 616, 618 (1974).
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tomer supplied programing that the licensee reasonably determines to be ob-
scene, profane or indecent." 99 This request, and another concerning obscenity
on telephones,"'0 caused the FCC to issue a Notice of Inquiry into common
carrier anti-obscenity rules.101 Permitting this sort of censorship would move
MDS out of the pure common carrier status, and it would raise questions as to
whether, for example, the airing by Home Box Office of an old Ronald Rea-
gan movie during the 1984 campaign would create an equal opportunity for
his opponent.
Subscription television (STV) is the broadcasting of a scrambled televi-
sion signal, which upon payment of a fee, subscribers are authorized to un-
scramble through use of a decoder.102 Since it is broadcasting, STV is subject
to the same regulations regarding political broadcasting as other broadcasters.
In 1982, the Commission substantially deregulated the service, but the politi-
cal broadcasting rules were not included among the regulations lifted.1"3
The Commission has, however, afforded STV special treatment for the
application of the "reasonable access" requirement based on its special
characteristics:
The purpose of giving of federal candidates the right to prime time spots
and programming is based upon the fact that prime time generally is the
period of maximum audience potential. Since subscription television program-
ming is "generally" geared to selective audiences it would appear that those
stations engaged in STV would have their periods of maximum audience po-
tential outside of normal prime time viewing periods. Therefore, we do not
believe that reasonable access requires STV stations to make available to fed-
eral candidates those periods of time in which they are engaged in STVprogramming.'"
Aside from this modification, STV operators must comply with all other equal
opportunity and fairness doctrine requirements. 0 5
Low power television (LPTV) uses very weak signals to broadcast over a
small area, perhaps ten to fifteen miles, without interfering with other signals.
The stations are limited to 1000 watts of power, compared to as many as five
million watts for some standard broadcast stations. The FCC has received
thousands of applications for LPTV licenses, and it is granting licenses now in
rural areas. It will be years before LPTV stations are operational in urban
areas. The potential exists, however, for LPTV stations to target particular
99. Multipoint Distrib. Sys., Inc., File No. CCB DFD 83-2 (June 14, 1983).
100. Peter F. Coholan, File No. E 83-14 (Mar. 31, 1983).
101. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,348 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. 1). A further notice of
inquiry and proposed rulemaking was issued early this year. 49 Fed. Reg. 2,214 (1984) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. 1).
102. The earlier STV orders refer to both cable STV and broadcasting STV, e.g., First
Report & Order in Docket Nos. 18,893 & 19,554, 52 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), but later orders refer
only to broadcasting.
103. Third Report & Order in Docket No. 21,502, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982).
104. Report & Order in BC Docket No. 78-102, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1093 (1978).
105. See Stem, Krasnow, & Senkowski, supra note 2, at 573.
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ethnic or racial communities, or, perhaps, suburban areas now served only by
metropolitan-wide stations. 106
The FCC has decided that equal opportunity and fairness doctrine re-
quirements will apply to programs originated by the LPTV station. In 1982,
the Commission wrote:
If the Commission receives a complaint related to Part I of the Fairness
Doctrine, the station may meet it by showing that it aired responsive issue-
oriented programming submitted in a mode compatible with the station's orig-
ination equipment. Likewise, to meet its obligation under Part II of the Fair-
ness Doctrine, the station must make time available, with or without sponsor-
ship, to responsive issue-oriented programming submitted in a format
compatible with the station's origination equipment. The fairness obligation
would be on a sliding scale, depending upon the direct involvement of the
station management in program production and decisions. Similarly, Sections
312(a)(7) and (f) and 315 will apply to low power stations, to the extent that
their origination capacity permits. 107
Since LPTV is broadcasting, these requirements should certainly continue
to apply. To the extent that LPTV stations are engaged principally in the
retransmission of other broadcast stations, or of satellite programing, the is-
sues raised regarding cable television also arise here. While it may be prema-
ture to attempt to define the scope of regulation of political broadcasting, the
potential of LPTV for candidate use is enormous, and the originator must be
held responsible for assuring that both sides of issues and campaigns are
presented.
In satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, earth stations
pull down signals from satellites, including pay channel signals, and program-
ming is provided to tenants of apartment buildings and complexes, to hotels
and to other densely populated buildings which are internally wired to dis-
tribute the signals. On November 8, 1983, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling
that state and local regulation of SMATV are preempted by federal regula-
tions.'08 The commission has not decided whether political broadcasting rules
apply to SMATV.
Electronic mail is considered to be a type of videotex, in which the sender
types a letter on a home computer keyboard. The letter is transmitted as digi-
tal data over telephone lines or cable. A central computer sorts and delivers
the message to the "electronic address" of the recipient's home computer,
where the signal is reconstructed into words on a screen or printed on paper.
Several companies are developing commercial systems, and the United States
Postal Service's ECOM service allows bulk mailers to transmit letters elec-
tronically to special postal centers, where they are printed out and delivered by
mail carriers. Electronic mail as currently conceived is a common carrier ser-
106. See id. at 538-39.
107. Report & Order in Docket No. 82-107, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, 21,491 (1982) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
108. Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., No. 83-526 (Nov. 8, 1983).
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vice, and therefore not subject to political content rules."'°
III. CONCLUSION
The rapid advance of technology means that candidates, issue groups, the
FCC, and the bar soon will be faced with applying the current broadcasting
rules to new modes of communication. To assure the continued availability of
the fullest public debate on candidates and issues, the equal opportunity rule
and the fairness doctrine should be applied in every reasonable circumstance.
Such application is constitutionally permissible and required by the public
interest.
109. See Geller & Lampert, supra note 15, at 621.
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